THE UNION OF MIND AND BODY IN THE CARTESIAN DUALISM by Riyanto, Armada
THE UNION OF MIND AND 
BODY IN THE CARTESIAN 
DUALISM
Armada Riyanto STFT Widya Sasana, Malang, Indonesia         
ABSTRACT
Dalam disiplin ilmu filsafat sejak Yunani Awali, manusia 
dimengerti sebagai terdiri dari badan dan jiwa. Bagi 
Sokrates manusia adalah jiwa-nya. Sebab, badan tidak 
menampilkan kodrat kemanusiawian yang sesungguhnya. 
Plato melanjutkan Sokrates dengan “menyangkal” 
kepentingan keberadaan badan.  Problem filosofis klasik 
itu berlanjut pada pemikiran René Descartes yang 
menyatakan bahwa badan adalah res extensa (itu yang 
memiliki keluasan), sementara jiwa res cogitans (itu yang 
berpikir). Karena itu, dalam Descartes istilah yang lebih 
tepat untuk jiwa adalah “mind” daripada “soul”. Tetapi 
soal paling krusial dari definisi ini ialah bagaimana 
mungkin yang material bersatu sedemikian rupa dengan 
res cogitans sehingga menyusun sebuah kesatuan tunggal 
eksistensi manusia yang begitu memesona? Pertanyaan 
inilah yang menjadi status questionis dari artikel ini.
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he crucial problem in Descartes' concept of  human being could Tbe formulated as follows: How two really distinct things, mind and 
body, can somehow generate another thing, human being, which is itself  a 
unity, that is, a genuine individual or an ens per se. By ens per se Descartes 
means a substance. In Aristotle substance is linked to the composition of  
form and matter. Form is a substance, while matter is an accident. In 
Thomas Aquinas, ens per se cannot have a plurality of  actual constituents. 
The contrary of  an ens per se is ens per accidens, that is, if  the union is accidental 
to at least one of  the components. 
Here, what I want to elaborate is whether there is in Descartes' 
philosophy a notion of  the union of  mind and body which gives a 
satisfactory account of  the unity of  human being,  an account according to 
which a human being has an intuitive claim being one thing, and not merely 
two things conjoined. Or, whether in Descartes the unity of  human being is 
understood as ens per se or ens per accidens. If  the union of  body is ens per se,  it  
1
follows that a human being is a genuine individual.
That Descartes considers a human being to be a genuine individual is 
an underappreciated fact among commentators. To take an extreme case, in 
a recent article, Fred Sommers alleges that "a Cartesian person is a non-
individual, since it is composed of  a mind and a body," and he leaves the 
impression that it is Descartes' intention to characterize human beings as 
2
non-individuals.  Etienne Gilson also asserts that because of  the distinction 
between mind and body Descartes has a difficulty to explain human's 
individuality. He says that "Medieval philosophy distinguished  the body 
and soul less really than Descartes, in that they did not make two complete 
substances, and this is why they had less difficulty than Descartes in uniting 
3
them."
Human's Composition of  Body and Mind
Many philosophers believe that human is a being composed of  mind 
and body. This view involves two claims. One is that mind is something 
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distinct from the body. The other is that the mind and the body form a unity 
which is a human. Some philosophers have emphasized the former claim, 
while others have emphasized the latter.
Plato and Augustine emphasized the distinction between soul and 
body. That the soul is something distinct from the body, they believed to be 
apparent from the fact that what the soul knows best, it knows without the 
aid of  any bodily operations. If  the soul can know without the aid of  the 
body, then the soul is neither a part nor an aspect of  the body. On the 
contrary, it is an incorporeal thing, which is independent of  and thus 
separable from the body.
On the other hand, Aristotle and Aquinas insisted upon the unity of  
human, because otherwise phenomena such as sensation and voluntary 
movement, which involve the operation of  both soul and body, could not 
be explained. They reconciled the dualism of  soul and body to the unity of  
man by saying that the body and the soul are united as matter (materi) to 
form (forma). The soul, as the substantial form of  the body, is what makes 
the body an actually living organism.
One who adopts the theory that the soul and the body are independent 
entities is faced with the task of  explaining the phenomena which make the 
unity of  man plausible. Augustine explained the phenomena of  sensation 
and voluntary movement in terms of  the soul's action upon the body. 
According to his conception of  the causal situation, the inferior cannot act 
upon the superior. Thus, if  two unequal things are in a causal relation, the 
cause is the one which is superior and the effect the one which is inferior. 
The superiority of  one thing is judge on the basis of  its relative simplicity. 
Since the soul is simpler than the body, it is superior to the body. Thus, in all 
cases in which the soul and the body are in a causal relation, it is the soul 
which acts upon the body. This includes the case of  sensation, for sensation 
occurs only when the soul "directs the sense to the sensible thing and keeps 
4
the vision itself  fixed upon it. ”
Descartes' Dualism
Like Plato and Augustine, Descartes emphasizes the dualism of  mind 
and body. If  matter or body is not something really distinct from mind, then 
the new science, which offers only mechanistic explanations, would not give 
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an exhaustive account of  the physical world. Similarly, if  the mind were not 
something really distinct from matter, then the religious doctrine of  
5
personal immortality would be untenable.  By mind Descartes means that 
which corresponds to the power of  knowing that everyone has.
 The power of  knowing, according to its various functions, is 
sometimes called pure understanding, sometimes imagination, 
sometimes memory, sometimes sensation; but, properly speaking, it 
is called mind when it forms new ideas in the imagination [phantasia], 
6
or when it applies itself  to those which are already traced there.
The body is defined as that which is different from mind. 
 
 I conceive fully what a body is (that is, I conceive body as a 
complete thing), when I think only that it is a thing, which is 
extended, shaped, mobile, etc., while I deny of  it all the things which 
7
belong to the nature of  mind.
 Descartes even emphasizes that body is the substance that immediately 
presupposes extension, like shape, local movement. It could be seen in 
these statements:
 The substance which is immediately the subject of  extension 
and of  the accidents which presuppose extension, like shape, 
8
position, local movement, etc., is called Body.
The body is corporeal substance which is related to the local extension:
 There are certain acts which we call corporeal, like size, shape, 
motion, and all the other things which cannot be conceived without 
local extension, and we call by the name body the substance in which 
9
they reside.
That the body is the corporeal substance is evident by itself: 
If  it is said, for example, that a body is a corporeal substance, without 
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at the same time defining what a corporeal substance is, these two 
words, corporeal substance, will not make us in any way more 
10
knowledgeable than the word body.
Therefore, the body is divisible:
 Being extended, divisible, of  a given shape, etc., are the forms or 
the attributes by means of  which I know that substance which is 
11
called body.
It is God who makes body of  man. God makes it from earth. The body is 
something like statue or machine.
 I suppose (in this Treatise) that the body is nothing other than a 
12
statue or machine made of  earth, which God forms expressly.
Descartes believes that function of  the body coincides with its laws laid 
down by God him self.
 God has made our body as a machine and has willed that it 
functions as a universal instrument; operating always in the same 
13
manner according to its own laws.
Descartes states that mind and body is different. Their difference is 
great so as to create the rough dualism of  mind and body. They differ to  
each other by nature. By saying nature Descartes would means that such 
difference is created by God. 
 There is a great difference between the mind and the body, in 
that the body, by nature, is always divisible, and the mind is entirely 
14
indivisible.
Even the mind is not influenced by the corporeal substance:
 The mind does not receive impressions from all parts of  the 
body immediately, but only from the brain, or perhaps even from one 
15
of  its smallest parts [i.e., the pineal gland].
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In this following statement, assertively Descartes says that the mind is 
not body. This statement seems to be tautology, but it indicates that 
Descartes really distinguishes or separates body and mind in man.
Everything which can think is mind or is called mind. But, because 
16
body and mind are really distinct, that which is not body is mind.
Descartes claims that he is the first man who elaborates this 
understanding:
 No one before me, as far as I know, asserted that mind 
consisted in one thing alone, namely the faculty of  thinking and the 
17
inward source [of  “thinkind”].
According to Descartes' doctrine of  the real distinction between mind 
and body, it is not merely the case that the mind and the body can exist apart. 
They are two substances which have entirely different natures. The nature 
of  the body is extension and the nature of  the mind thought, and there is 
nothing at all common to thought and extension. The mind and the body 
are not capable of  the same sorts of  modifications. The mind is capable 
only of  modifications of  thought, and the body only of  modifications of  
extension. 
Like Augustine, Descartes seeks to explain the phenomena which 
make the unity of  man plausible, by appealing to the notion of  causal 
influence. In order to explain sense experience Descartes maintains that the 
body has causal influence upon the mind. In order to explain such 
phenomena as memory, imagination and voluntary movement, he 
maintains that the mind has causal influence upon the body.
For the Augustinian principle that the inferior cannot act upon the 
superior, Descartes substitutes the principle, manifest by natural light, that 
the cause must be adequate to the effect. The sense in which the cause must 
be adequate to its effect is expressed in two ways: The first axiom is 
"whatever reality or perfection exists in a thing exists formally or else 
18
eminently in its first and adequate cause."   Regarding the first axiom he 
says more clearly in the following excerpt:
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 That there is nothing in the effect, that has not existed in a 
similar or in some higher form in the cause, is a first principle than 
which none clearer can be entertained. The common truth 'from 
nothing, nothing comes' is identical with it. For, if  we allow that there 
is something in the effect which did not exist in the cause, we must 
grant also that this something has been created from nothing; again 
the only reason why nothing cannot be the cause of  a thing, is that in 
such a cause there would not be the same thing as existed in the 
19
effect.  
The second axiom is said in the Third Meditation: "Now it is manifest 
by the natural light that there must at least be as much reality in the efficient 
and total cause as in its effect." Like the first axiom, this axiom or statement 
is based upon the principle that something cannot come from nothing. 
What is produced in the effect must first exist in the cause. If  the cause 
produced something in the effect which it did not first possess in itself  and 
communicate to the effect, that thing would be produced from nothing. 
Thus, the cause must  contain in itself  so as to bring about in the effect. In 
order that the cause may contain in itself  what it brings about in the effect, 
the cause and the effect must have something in common.
The Questions of   Descartes' Dualism 
The problem begins with the question of  Gassendi with regards to the 
Meditations: How can the soul move the body, if  the soul is not material, and 
how can it receive species of  corporeal objects? Descartes answers that "the 
perplexity involved in these questions arises entirely from a false 
supposition that can by no manner of  means be proved, namely, that if  the 
soul and body are two substances of  diverse nature that prevents them from 
20
being capable of  acting on one another."  This answer, however, is clearly 
unsatisfactory. For, as Descartes himself  sees the causal situation, one 
substance cannot produce a modification in another substance which is of  
an entirely different nature.
Besides Gassendi's question, in her letter of  May 6/16 and June 10/20, 
1643, Princess Elizabeth asked Descartes how mind thinking and 
unextended, could interact with body, extended and unthinking. In his 
response Descartes appeals to the "primitive" notion of  the union of  mind 
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and body. Descartes says:
First I observe that there are in us certain primitive notions which are 
as it were models on which all our other knowledge is patterned. 
There are very few such notions. First, there are the most general 
ones, such as being, number, and duration, which apply to everything 
we can conceive. Then, as regards body in particular, we have only 
the notion of  extension which entails the notions of  shape and 
motion; and as regards soul in particular we have only the notion of  
thought, which includes the conceptions of  the intellect and the 
inclinations of  the will. Finally, as regards soul and body together, we 
have only the notion of  their union, on which depends our notion of  
the soul's power to move the body, and the body's power to act on the 
21
soul and cause sensations and passions.
Descartes tries to accommodate his principle that the cause must be 
adequate to the effect, by de-emphasizing his doctrine of  the complete 
disparity between mind and body. The mind can cause changes in the body, 
and the body can cause changes in the mind, by virtue of  the substantial 
union of  mind and body.
Thus, Descartes' notion of  the union of  mind and body arises in 
response to the problem of  how the mind and the body can causally 
interact. Or, if  two substances have different natures, how can there be a 
union of  these substances which is itself  a simple nature? 
Descartes' Belief  of  The Unity of  Human Being
Descartes, however, belives that a human being is a unity. In this 
excerpt he gives a decisive example of  how he himself  unites with his own 
body:
Nature teaches me also by the sensations of  pain, hunger, thirst, etc., 
that I am not only housed in my body, like a pilot in his ship, but, 
besides that, that I am conjoined very tightly and so mixed and 
22
mingled with it, that I compose a single whole with it.
Even the mind is imprinted in the body:
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 The mind, although really distinguished from the body, is 
nevertheless joined to it, and is touched by the traces [vestigia] which 
23
are imprinted in it.
The mind is not only imprinted, but also moves the body. This causal 
movement of  the body can be seen in the daily experience:
 For the fact that the mind, which is incorporeal, can make the 
body move, there is neither reasoning nor comparison derived from 
other things which could teach us; but experiences which are very 
24
certain and very evident make us recognize it every day.
Similarly, in the Passions of  the Soul he states:
 The soul is truly joined to the whole body, and one cannot 
properly say that it is in some one of  its parts to the exclusion of  
25
others.
In Article 31, he says that the soul exercises its functions in the body:
 Although the soul is joined to the whole body, there is 
nevertheless in the body a certain part in which the soul exercises its 
functions more particularly than in all the others. And it is usually 
26
believed that this part is the brain, or perhaps the heart.
It is evident that for Descartes the body is united to the soul, since from 
experience when someone talks about the body, it refers to the body of  man 
united with the soul, not the separated body in itself. This long excerpt can 
bring into light such a belief  of  Descartes:
 I find that the word body is quite equivocal; for, when we speak 
of  a body in general, we understand a determinate part of  matter, and 
altogether of  the quantity of  which the universe is composed, so that 
one could not take away ever so little from that quantity, without our 
judging immediately that the body is smaller, and that it is no longer 
whole, nor change any particle of  that matter, without our thinking 
that the body is no longer totally the same, or numerically the same. 
But, when we speak of  the body of  a man, we do not understand a 
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determinate part of  matter, nor one which has a determinate size, but 
we merely understand all the matter which is, taken altogether, united 
with the soul of  that man; in such a way that, even though that matter 
changes, and even though its quantity increases or diminishes, we still 
believe that it is the same body, numerically the same, as long as it 
27
remains joined and substantially united to the same soul.
Again, he gives a decisive account of  the unity of  body and soul. He 
states that the soul is truly joined to the body:
 The soul is truly joined to all the body, and it cannot be properly 
said to be in some one of  these parts to the exclusion of  the others, 
because the body is one, and in some fashion indivisible, because of  
the placement of  its organs, which are all so related to one another 
that when one of  them is taken away, that makes the whole body 
defective; and because the soul is of  a nature which has no reference 
to extension, nor to dimensions, or other properties of  the matter of  
which the body is composed, but simply to the whole union of  its 
28
organs.
It is certainly true that Descartes emphasizes the real distinction 
between mind and body much more than the unity of  a human being. He 
admits as much in a letter to Princess Elizabeth and gives a hint as to why:
 There are two facts about the human soul on which depend all 
the things we can know of  its nature. The first is that it thinks, the 
second is that it is united to the body and can act and be acted upon 
along with it. About the second I have said hardly anything; I have 
tried only to make the first well understood. For my principal aim 
was to prove the distinction between soul and body, and to this end 
29
only the first was useful, and the second might have been harmful.
In another letter, this time to Regius, he makes a very similar remark:
 Many people make the mistake of  thinking that the soul is not 
really distinct from the body than make the mistake of  admitting 
their distinction and denying their substantial union, and in order to 
refute those who believe souls to be mortal it is more important to 
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teach the distinction of  parts in man than to teach their union.
But to teach the distinction between mind and body is not to deny their 
union. Earlier in the same letter to Regius, Descartes advises him to say that 
he believes a human being is a true ens per se: 
 And whenever the occasion arises, in public and in private, you 
should give out that you believe that a human being is a true ens per se, 
and not ens per accidens, and that the mind and the body are united in a 
real and substantial manner. You must say that they are united not by 
position or disposition, as you say in your last paper -- for this too is 
open to objection and, in my opinion, quite untrue -- but by a true 
mode of  union, as everyone agrees, though nobody explains what 
31
this means and so you need not do so either. .
These three passages from the letters to Princess Elizabeth and Regius 
give clear indication that Descartes does not call into question the 
Aristotelian and common view that a human being is a genuine unity, that is, 
an individual. There is other important evidence that Descartes believes a 
human being is an individual. In the Sixth Meditation he asserts that he is not 
united to his body as a pilot to a ship, but is "closely joined and, as it were, 
32
mixed together with it, so that I make up one thing with it."  Moreover, 
there are several passages in which he refers to the substantial union of  
mind and body (some are already mentioned above). By using the 
expression "substantial union" I take him to be pointing out not merely that 
the union is a union of  two substances, which he does think is the case, but 
that the product of  the union is itself  a substance. Descartes uses the terms 
"substance", ens per se, and "complete thing interchangeably, and all of  them 
I take to be equivalent to my terms "individual" and "genuine unity." 
There is a standard picture of  the Cartesian created universe which 
perhaps contributes to the tendency to deny that Descartes conceives of  a 
human being as a genuine individual. According to this picture, the 
Cartesian created universe is populated by a lot of  minds, but only one 
extended substance, the entire extended world, of  which individual bodies 
are merely modes.
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 We do not form two ideas in our imagination, one of  body, and 
33
the other of  extension, but a single idea, that of  an extended body.
Such a picture makes it difficult to see how a human being could be a 
genuine individual. How could a substance, in this case a mind, be 
combined with a mode of  another substance, in this case a human body, to 
form a genuine unity? 
Martial Gueroult ascribes to Descartes a very strong notion of  what it 
is to be a created substance in the strict sense, according to which only God 
can cause substances to come into or to go out of  existence, and according 
34
to which substances can go out of  existence only by annihilation.  The key 
evidence in favor of  Gueroult's interpretation is a famous passage from the 
Synopsis of  the Meditations: 
 First, it must be known that absolutely all substances or things 
which must be created by God in order to exist, are by their nature 
incorruptible, nor can they ever cease to be unless they are reduced 
to nothing by God denying them His concurrence, and second, it 
must be noted that body, at least taken generally, is a substance and 
for that reason never perishes. But the human body differs from 
other bodies only insofar as it is composed of  a certain configuration 
of  members and other such accidents; while the human mind is not 
similarly composed out of  any accidents, but is a pure substance; for 
although all its accidents are changed, so that it understands other 
things, wills others, senses others, etc., the mind does not for that 
reason become something else; however, the human body becomes 
something else from the sole fact that the shape of  some one of  its 
parts is changed; from which it follows that body very easily ceases to 
35
exist, whereas the mind by its nature is immortal.  
In the Synopsis passage quoted above, Descartes suggests that entities 
which satisfy the conditions of  the strong conception of  created substance 
are not composed of  parts or other similar accidents. Following his 
language in that passage, we can refer to such substances as pure substances. 
But even though bodies are composed of  parts and so fall short of  being 
pure substances -- we might call them impure substances -- they 
nevertheless should still be considered as full-fledged substances. 
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Therefore, contrary to the standard picture of  the Cartesian created 
universe, Descartes, in constructing a human being, does not face the 
impossible task of  generating a unity out of  a substance and a mode of  
another substance. His task, which may seem equally impossible, is that of  
generating a unity out of  two substances. 
It is clear that the issue as to whether Descartes' human being can claim 
to be a unity is not whether it satisfies the conditions of  the strong 
conception of  reated substance. Accordingly, I am not referring to the 
strong conception when I say that he uses the term "substance" to mean a 
unity. Descartes thinks the substantial union of  mind and body is 
incomprehensible from the point of  view of  our finite intellects, even 
though it is an indubitable fact made known by sensation and made possible 
by God's omnipotence. 
Descartes could propose that a union of  things generates a per se unity 
when that union is not accidental to at least one of  the components. This 
would entail that a human being is an ens per se, provided that a human being 
is understood to be a composite of  a mind and a human body, as opposed to 
being a composite of  a mind and a determinate part of  matter.
If  the human body cannot exist without being united to the mind, it 
would seem to follow by his own criteria that mind and body are only 
modally distinct. I have argued elsewhere, however, that hi account of  real 
distinction does not require that mind and body can each exist out of  real 
union with the other. Instead, what he does require for real distinction, 
namely, that each can exist without having the essential attribute of  the 
other existing in it, is consistent with the claim that the body must be united 
to the mind in order to exist. 
In a letter of  December 1641, in which he is again coaching Regius, 
under fire for asserting that a human being is an ens per accidens, he advises 
him to say that it is not absolutely accidental to the mind that it be united to 
the body or to the body that it be united to the mind, and tells him not to 
deny that it is only due to a miracle that they can exist apart.
 It may be objected that it is not accidental to the human body 
that it should be conjoined to the soul, but its very nature, since, 
when a body has all the dispositions required to receive the soul, 
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without which it is not a human body, it cannot, without a miracle, be 
that the soul is not united to it. Moreover, it may be objected that it is 
not accidental to the soul that it should be joined to the body, but it is 
only accidental to it that it should be separated from the body after 
death. All of  this should not be denied, lest the theologians be 
offended again, but nevertheless, it ought to be responded that these 
things can on this account be said to be accidental, that considering 
the body alone, we clearly perceive nothing in it on account of  which 
it demands to be united to the soul, as we perceive nothing in the soul 
on account of  which it must be united to the body, which is why I 
said above that it is in a certain manner accidental, not that it is 
36
absolutely accidental.
The other response to the objection that Descartes' human being is not 
an ens per se is found in the same letter to Regius. He advises Regius to say that 
something can be both an ens per se and an ens per accidens: 
 That which is an ens per se can be made per accidens, for mice are 
37
generated or made by accident from dirt, and yet are entia per se.
A human being is an ens per se because
 Body and soul, in relation to the whole human, are incomplete 
substances, and it follows from their being incomplete that what they 
38
constitute is an ens per se.
A human being is an ens per accidens because
 Considering the body alone, we clearly perceive nothing in it on 
account of  which it demands to be united to the soul, as we perceive 
nothing in the soul on account of  which it must be united to the 
body, which is why I said above that it is in a certain manner 
39
accidental, not that it is absolutely accidental.
Conclusion
It is undeniable that Descartes sometimes mentions that body and 
mind are united, and sometimes emphasizes that human being consists of  
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mind and body. Descartes' view of  the union of  body and mind is obscure.  
For example after a year he wrote to Regius that "the mind and the body are 
41
united in a real and substantial manner,"   he said, "We affirm that a human 
42
being is made up of  body and soul."
Therefore, the union of  body and mind which constitutes a human 
being as a substance, in Descartes, cannot be concluded evidently as or an 
ens per se or an ens per accidens. We should remember that Descartes applies 
both ens per se and ens per accidens to the union of  body and mind in human 
being. Human being is in one sense ens per se and in another sense an ens per 
accidens. By stating this, Descartes seems simply to avoid controversy. In 
Replies to the Forth Objections he asserts that a hand is both complete, when 
considered by itself, and incomplete, when referred to the whole body of  
which it a part, and he uses this example as an analogy to illustrate how mind 
43
and body are at once complete and incomplete.  However, Descartes' 
philosophical account on the union of  body and mind becomes a crucial 
point which creates a perennial unresolved problem of  the mystery of  
human being. 
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